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In this volume, Burke (2014) makes a
number of arguments for why evolution-
ary approaches have failed to penetrate
the rest of the field of psychology (what
Burke refers to as “mainstream” psychol-
ogy). While all of his arguments have
merit, I will focus on one that I consider
to be particularly important—the charac-
terization by critics of the “Santa Barbara
school” (Laland and Brown, 2011) as rep-
resentative of all evolutionary approaches
to psychology. Here, I agree with this
point, and I expand upon Burke’s point to
argue that the focus on massive modular-
ity as one of the foundational principles
of evolutionary psychology is “putting the
theory before the data,” and opens the dis-
cipline to criticism that is unwarranted for
many of its researchers.
In 2013, I was fortunate to attend a
talk by John Richer at the International
Society for Human Ethology’s Summer
Institute, who argued that there is much
to be gained from applying the ethologi-
cal methodology of observation and doc-
umentation to clinical psychology settings.
He was advocating deviating from hypoth-
esis and experimentation, and applying a
technique more akin to the production
of ethnographies in social anthropology
(Richer, 2014). While initially resistant to
the idea, I later read Rozin’s (2001) cri-
tique of the state of social psychologi-
cal research. A comparison is made to
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural
selection which, he argues, was the result
of a large body of observation, descrip-
tion and documentation that took place
before the formalization of foundational
principles. It grew out of an empiricist—as
opposed to theorist—desire to understand
the origins of species. Rozin argues that
social psychology, in its rush to model
itself on more established lines of research,
such as biology and cognitive science, has
skipped these important stages of observa-
tion and description, which he considers
so critical to the development of a young
discipline. In so doing, Rozin argues, social
psychologists have rushed to formalize as
theoretical underpinnings of the discipline
ideas that have little supporting evidence,
and have greatly restricted the range of
acceptable topics for investigation within
the field.
The situation in evolutionary psychol-
ogy is similar, though not identical. Early
in its conception, researchers attempted to
formalize the field with a set of foun-
dational principles—typically evolved
psychological mechanisms, massive
modularity of mind/domain specificity
and the concept of an environment of evo-
lutionary adaptedness, often assumed to
be the Pleistocene (Cosmides and Tooby,
1987). These principles are not univer-
sally accepted within the community
of researchers who take an evolution-
ary approach to psychology (Laland and
Brown, 2011), and Burke (2014) argues
that the massively modular view of the
brain is not necessary for the application of
evolutionary theory to psychology. Indeed,
most research in the field is focused
on gathering observations and testing
hypotheses derived from fundamental
evolutionary principles, rather than from
the Santa Barbara school’s formulation
(Burke, 2014).
In most discussions about modularity
and plasticity in the mind, the argument
is really over the degree of modularity
in the mind, and therefore the level on
which selection operates. In much of the
research being conducted in the field of
evolutionary approaches to psychology,
this distinction is, however, largely irrel-
evant. In contrast to the criticisms of
many critics of evolutionary approaches
to behavior (Benton, 2000), even adher-
ents to the Santa Barbara school’s for-
mulation predict the evolution of flexible
mental modules in order to allow flex-
ibility of behavior in response to envi-
ronmental and internal factors (Kurzban,
2002; see also Sperber, 2005). Consider the
example of men’s preferences for women’s
body size, which is hypothesized to rep-
resent a preference for healthy weight
given the local environmental conditions.
Men living in areas of food scarcity pre-
fer higher BMI women, as this is most
adaptive, while men in areas of food secu-
rity prefer lower BMI women, as this is
most adaptive given the local conditions
(Tovée et al., 2006). This same hypothe-
sis follows equally from a massive mod-
ularity, Santa Barbara school approach as
from a mental plasticity, cultural evolu-
tion approach. The Santa Barbara school
approach predicts that an evolved men-
tal module for body size preference should
have been selected to be sensitive to local
ecological conditions, and would there-
fore predict the pattern of higher BMI
preferences in areas of food scarcity and
lower BMI preferences in areas of food
security. A more moderate modularity
approach would predict a mental mod-
ule for attractiveness that can learn the
appropriate preferences given the local
ecological conditions, and thus predict the
same pattern. Finally, a mental plasticity,
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cultural evolution approach would pre-
dict that culturally transmitted body size
preferences would result in fitness bene-
fits for those who carried the appropriate
body size preference given the local eco-
logical conditions, and would therefore
predict the same pattern. It is not nec-
essary to commit to one of these models
of mind in order to formulate hypotheses
based on evolutionary predictions (Burke,
2014). The necessary foundational prin-
ciples are merely that behavior, cognition
and perception have fitness consequences,
and that selection shapes behavior, per-
ception and cognition; something upon
which all researchers adopting evolution-
ary approaches to psychology can surely
agree.
While mainstream cognitive psychol-
ogy and neuroscience are producing some
convincing data that different types of
information are processed in different
brain regions—which could be consid-
ered modules—and there have been some
well-reasoned defenses of the concept
of massive modularity (e.g., Barrett and
Kurzban, 2006), the conception of the
massively modular mind lacks sufficient
empirical evidence (Laland and Brown,
2011). Burke (2014) points out that, in
the absence of alternative formally artic-
ulated sets of foundational principles,
the Santa Barbara school’s formulation
presents critics of evolutionary approaches
to psychology with a supposed founda-
tional principle that lacks a solid empirical
basis, and allows these critics to dismiss
the entire field as built on shaky foun-
dations. Ironically, the criticism that is
aimed at evolutionary approaches to psy-
chology (which, it should be noted, began
well before the formalization of the Santa
Barbara principles) provides substantial
pressure to formalize that other disciplines
did not have to weather during their early
stages (Rozin, 2001). Laland and Brown
(2011) point out that Wilson felt that
sociobiology was held up to unfair stan-
dards: “While the sociological or cultural
model is assumed to be true unless proven
false beyond any possible doubt, the bio-
logical model is assumed to be false unless
evidence is completely unassailable in their
support.” This could also be said of evo-
lutionary approaches to psychology more
generally.
So where to from here? Others in this
volume argue that the massive modularity
of mind is an empirical question (Barrett
et al., 2014), and I strongly agree. It may
well turn out to be true, but before identi-
fying this model of mind as a foundational
principle, it is important to ensure that it
is well supported empirically. In the mean-
time, it is encouraging to note that the
early attempt to formalize foundational
principles has not led to the over-focus
on a small number of topics and tech-
niques that Rozin (2001) decries in social
psychology. Evolutionary approaches to
psychology investigate a wide range of
topics, from mate selection, life history
strategy, food gathering and sharing, coop-
eration and altruism, aggression, gender
roles, and parenting, and use a wide range
of techniques—experimental psychologi-
cal techniques, game theory, ethology, and
ethnographic observations to name but a
few. Anyone who attends HBES, EHBEA,
ISHE or any of the other conferences ded-
icated to the approach will discover that
new fields of study are constantly being
approached through the lens of evolution-
ary theory.
In conclusion, then, while there is pres-
sure from critics of the field to declare a
set of foundational principles for the field,
including determining whether or not the
mind is domain specific and massively
modular, these are empirical questions
that require further research. Further, the
structure of the mind is not a prereq-
uisite for the investigation of psychol-
ogy through an evolutionary lens. The
field should therefore continue to research
the question of modularity of mind, and
continue to explore the broad range of
human behavior and cognition through
observation, documentation and hypothe-
sis generation and testing. There is little to
be gained by prematurely formalizing the
foundations of the field—putting the the-
ory before the data—particularly if those
foundations later turn out to be shaky.
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